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Abstract—This paper investigates the energy-efficient power
allocation for a two-tier, underlaid femtocell network. The be-
haviors of the Macrocell Base Station (MBS) and the Femtocell
Users (FUs) are modeled hierarchically as a Stackelberg game.
The MBS guarantees its own QoS requirement by charging the
FUs individually according to the cross-tier interference, and
the FUs responds by controlling the local transmit power non-
cooperatively. Due to the limit of information exchange in intra-
and inter-tiers, a self-learning based strategy-updating mechanism
is proposed for each user to learn the equilibrium strategies. In
the same Stackelberg-game framework, two different scenarios
based on the continuous and discrete power profiles for the
FUs are studied, respectively. The self-learning schemes in the
two scenarios are designed based on the local best response. By
studying the properties of the proposed game in the two situations,
the convergence property of the learning schemes is provided. The
simulation results are provided to support the theoretical finding
in different situations of the proposed game, and the efficiency of
the learning schemes is validated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Femtocells are considered to be an efficient and economic
solution to enhance the indoor experience of the cellular mobile
users [1]. A femtocell is a low-power, short-range access point,
which can be quickly deployed by the end-users. It provides
better spatial reuse of the spectrum by serving the nearby
users who have poorer connections with the Macrocell Base
Station (MBS) due to penetration loss. In practice, the femtocell
network usually operates underlaying the macrocell network.
This is mainly due to the ad-hoc topology of the femtocells
and thus the lack of coordination between the MBS and
Femto Access Points (FAPs). Consequently, inter-cell/cross-
tier interference arises, and interference mitigation becomes
necessary for preventing performance deterioration.
Due to the ad-hoc topology of the femtocells, the FAP
deployment faces the limited information exchange both across
tiers and among the femtocells. Therefore, it is desirable that the
interference management of the femtocells is fully distributed,
and each Femtocell User (FU) is capable of adapting to the
surrounding environment with minimum information. With this
in mind, we study the power control schemes for a shared-
spectrum, two-tier femtocell network. We note that the Macro-
cell User (MU) prefers that the cross-tier interference is mini-
mized, while the FUs prefers to transmit with the best Signal-to-
Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (SINR). Considering that private
objectives contradict with each other, it is natural to introduce
the tools of game theory and model the cross-tier, self-centric
interactions in the framework of non-cooperative games.
A. Related Work
Under the framework of non-cooperative games, the early
study [2] has discovered that power control purely based on
the non-cooperative games will lead to inefficient equilibria.
In order to obtain the Pareto-preferred equilibria, a number
of approaches including the introduction of repetition [3] or
externalities (e.g., pricing) [4], [5] are adopted in the research.
As shown by studies in non-hierarchical networks [4]–[6],
choosing a proper pricing mechanisms with respect to different
utility functions can be an efficient way of determining the
desired properties of the equilibria.
When it comes to the resource allocation in hierarchical
networks, such as the femtocell networks and cognitive radio
networks, the Stackelberg game [7] based modeling is widely
preferred since it is able to reflect the features of hierarchy and
ad-hoc topology in the network [8], [9]. the Stackelberg game
is characterized by the sequential decision making manner
(namely, the follower-leader strategy updating), and hence
suitable for modeling the heterogeneous user behaviors in the
network. Due to the computational intensity for obtaining the
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE), most of the existing studies [9]–
[11] adopt a utility model that favors the derivation of a closed-
form SE, and solve for the SEs through transforming the games
as hierarchical optimization problems.
Although the optimization-technique-based methods are able
to precisely analyze the properties of the SEs, their scope
is limited to the games with a certain categories of utility
functions. Beyond those games, a natural idea is to resort to
tools of iterative learning in repeated games for searching the
SEs. A body of literature on non-hierarchical networks can be
found applying iterative strategy-learning methods [12], [13],
usually based on the assumption of the discrete strategy space
[14]. However, since these learning methods assume homoge-
neous behaviors among the players, most of their application
to hierarchical networks are also limited within an uniform
learning model [15], [16].
B. Self-Learning under Pricing
In this paper, we model the power allocation problem in
the two-tier femtocell network from the perspective of the
Stackelberg game. In the game, the MBS behaves as the leader
and controls the total cross-tier interference by setting prices to
each FU-FAP link. The FU-FAP links behave as the followers
to optimize their energy efficiency through interactive power
allocation. In designing the distributed, hierarchical power
control scheme with pricing, the power efficiency is adopted
as the utility of the FU-FAP link. we investigate the scenarios
of the continuous and discrete power profile of the femtocells,
respectively. Due to the computational complexity of obtaining
the closed-form solution of the equilibrium, we investigate the
property of the game in the two situations, and propose two self-
centric strategy-learning algorithms for the follower game based
on the local myopic best response, respectively. We provide the
theoretical proof of the convergence of the learning schemes.
Also, we provide two heuristic algorithms for obtaining the
optimal MBS prices in the corresponding situations. In the
simulation, we provide the experimental comparison on the net-
work performance between the two scenarios, and demonstrate
the efficiency of the proposed learning algorithms.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Network Model
We consider the uplink transmission of a two-tier femtocell
network with a single MBS and K FAPs. The MBS and
the FAPs share the same bandwidth W and each of them is
scheduled to serve one single user at each time instance. The
MBS is required to keep the femtocell-to-macrocell interference
to an acceptable level. Due to the ad-hoc topology of the
femtocells, we assume that the information exchange only
happens between the MBS and FAPs. For analytical tractability,
we suppose that all the channels involved are block-fading and
remains constant during each transmission block.
In what follows, we let 0 denote the index of the MU-MBS
pair and k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K} denote the index of a FU-
FAP pair. The channel power gain between the transmitter of
pair i and the receiver of pair j is denoted by hi,j , where
i, j ∈ K
⋃
{0}. The power of transmitter k is denoted by pk and
the power vector of all the FUs is denoted by p = [p1, . . . , pk].
The noise variance for the transmitter-receiver pair k is denoted
by Nk. Then the SINR level at the MBS can be expressed as:
γ0(p0,p) =
h0,0p0
N0 +
∑
k∈K
hk,0pk
, (1)
and the SINR level at the k-th FAP can be expressed as
γk(p0,p) =
hk,kpk
Nk + h0,kp0 +
∑
j∈K\{k}
hj,kpj
. (2)
During the operation, it is usually beneficial to shift some
calls served by the MBS to the FAP. Therefore, we suppose
that for the MBS, the requirement on the femtocell-to-macrocell
interference is not rigid. Instead, the MU transmit with a fixed
power and the MBS charges each FU-FAP link for causing
interference with a certain price to control the interference level.
We denote the vector of interference prices at a time interval by
λ=[λ1, . . . , λK ], in which λk is the price for unit interference
caused by FU k. The goal of the MBS is to maximize the total
revenue of collecting payments from the FU-FAP links:
max
λ
(
u0=
∑
k∈K
λkhk,0pk
)
. (3)
For simplicity, in what follows we use the terms FU and the
FU-FAP link interchangeably. For the FUs, we assume that each
local transmit power pk is limited by the physical constraint
pk ∈ [0, p
max
k ]. The goal of FU k is to maximize its local net
payoff by adapting pk:
max
0≤pk≤pmaxk
(
uk = ψ(γk, pk)− λshk,0pk
)
, (4)
in which ψ(γk, pk) is the utility function of FU k. Considering
the practical scenarios, we adopt the local utility ψ(γk, pk) as
the energy efficiency (namely, the data received per unit energy
consumption) of each FU:
ψ(γk,pk) =
W log(1 + γk)
pk + pa
, (5)
where pa denotes the additional circuit power consumption for
FU k. We assume that the local SINR γk can be perfectly
measured at the FAP. For the proposed femtocell network, we
suppose that the following assumptions hold:
i) pk is significantly greater than pa;
ii) The femtocell-to-femtocell interference is sufficiently
small.
Assumption i) is based on the fact that most power is consumed
during operation by the amplifier and the radio transceiver [17].
Assumption ii) is based on the practical concerns that (a) the
FAPs are of low power, so the peak transmit power is limited;
and (b) the intercell gains between femtocells are usually weak
due to the path loss (since the indoor penetration loss is usually
significant). Based on the assumptions, we assume that the
SINR constraint for a FU-FAP link is negligible.
III. STACKELBERG GAME ANALYSIS
We model the user interactions in the proposed network
as a hierarchical game with the MBS and the FU-FAP links
choosing their actions in a sequential manner. When the power
allocation of the FUs are given as p, we can define the leader
game from the perspective of the MBS as:
Gl = 〈Λ, {u0(λ,p)}〉, (6)
in which the MBS is the only player of the game and the action
of the player is the price vector λ ∈ Λ.
When the leader action is given by λ, we can define the non-
cooperative follower game from the perspective of the FUs as:
Gf = 〈K,P , {uk(λ,pk,p−k)}k∈K〉, (7)
in which FU k is one player with the local action pk ∈ Pk.
With each player behaving rationally, the goal of the game
(6) and (7) is to finally reach the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE)
in which both the leader (MBS) and the followers (FUs) have
no incentive to deviate. We first assume that the strategies of
the FUs and MBS are continuous. Then the SE of the game
can be mathematically defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). The strategy (λ∗,p∗)
is a SE for the proposed Stackelberg game (6) and (7) if
u0(λ
∗,p∗)≥u0(λ,p∗), ∀λ∈Λ, (8)
uk(λ
∗,p∗k,p
∗
−k)≥uk(λ
∗,pk,p
∗
−k), ∀k ∈ K, ∀pk ∈ Pk. (9)
A. Femtocell Power Allocation with Continuous Strategies
We start the analysis of the Stackelberg game in (6) and (7)
by back induction. Suppose that the MBS first sets its strategy
as λ, then we obtain the non-cooperative follower subgame
described by (7). In order to show the existence of a pure-
strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) in Gf , we introduce the concept
of supermodular game as follows.
Definition 2 (Supermodularity [7]). A function f : X ×T → R
is said to have increasing differences (supermodularity) in (x, t)
if for all x′ ≥ x and t′ ≥ t,
f(x′, t′)− f(x, t′) ≥ f(x′, t)− f(x, t).
Definition 3 (Supermodular game [7], [18]). A general normal-
form game 〈N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 is a supermodular game if
for any player i ∈ N ,
i) the strategy space Si is a compact subset of RK .
ii) the payoff function ui is upper semi-continuous in s =
(si, s−i).
iii) ui is supermodular in si and has increasing difference
between any component of si and any component of s−i.
The supermodular property of the proposed follower sub-
game (7) is given by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Given the strategy λ of the MBS, the follower
subgame (7) is a supermodular game if γk ≥ pa/pk.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given the opponent strategies p−k, we define the local Best
Response (BR) of FU k by
pˆk(p−k) = argmax
0≤pk≤pmaxk
(
uk = ψ(γk, pk)− λshk,0pk
)
. (10)
Then Theorem 1 immediately yields Proposition 1 [18]:
Proposition 1. At least one pure-strategy NE exists in the
follower subgame (7) and the following points hold:
i) The set of NEs (9) has the component-wise greatest
element p∗ and least element p∗.
ii) If the BRs are single-valued, and each FU uses the
BR starting from the smallest (largest) elements of the
strategy space to update their strategies, then the strategies
monotonically converge to the smallest (largest) NE.
iii) If the game has a unique NE, then with any arbitrary
initial strategy, the local myopic BRs converges to the NE.
The properties of Gf in Proposition 1 sheds light on the
solution to the local strategy-learning scheme for the FUs. To
take advantages of these properties, we first examine the BRs
in Gf and obtain Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. Given the MBS strategy λ, uk is strictly quasicon-
cave and the best-response pˆk is single-valued for each FU.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on Lemma 1, we can further prove that the BR of
FU k has the following properties, and therefore is a standard
function [7]:
i) positivity: pˆk > 0,
ii) monotonicity: for any p′−k, p−k ∈ P−k, if p′−k > p−k,
then pˆk(p′−k) ≥ pˆk(p−k),
iii) scalability: ∀α > 1, αpˆk(p−k) > pˆk(αp−k).
Based on the aforementioned properties, we can directly apply
the results in [7] and deduce the uniqueness of the pure-strategy
NE in the follower subgame Gf .
Theorem 2. Given any MBS strategy λ, the follower subgame
(7) has a unique NE if the following condition is satisfied
hk,kpk
Nk + h0,kp0 +
∑
j∈K hj,kpk
≥
pa
pk
. (11)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 1. If in subgame Gf the condition of Theorem 2 is
satisfied, the condition of Theorem 1 will also be satisfied.
(11) indicates that to ensure the uniqueness of the NE, the
SINR of a FU should be significantly larger than the ratio
between its transmit power and circuit power. Such a condition
is guaranteed by our assumption of the network.
We assume that the channel power gain hk,0 is known and the
SINR γk can be perfectly measured by each FAP. Then, based
on Lemma 1, pˆk can be solved locally with the bisection method
[19]. Based on Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, the asynchronous
strategy-updating mechanism defined in [18] can be directly
applied to Gf . By Proposition 1, the convergence to the NE is
guaranteed from any arbitrary initial power vector. The strategy-
learning algorithm is summarized as Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 Asynchronous strategy updating
Require: each FU sets up an infinite increasing time sequence
{T ik}k∈K for scheduling strategy update.
1: for all t ∈ {T ik}k∈K do
2: for all k s.t. t = {T ik} do
3: given pt−1−k , obtain ptk = pˆk(p
t−1
−k ) as in (10) with
bisection.
4: end for
5: end for
B. Approximate Solution to the Price of MBS
When considering the leader subgame Gl, we assume that
the strategies of the FUs are given as p from (10). For the
subgame (6), the local BR is given by
λˆ = argmax
λ0
(∑
k∈K
λkhk,0pk
)
. (12)
To investigate the solution of (12), we first consider the fea-
sible region of λk. We note from (10) that the maximum value
of uk is lower-bounded by 0 (when pk=0) and upper-bounded
by ψ(γ˜k, p˜k), in which (γ˜k, p˜k) = argmaxψ(γk, pk). Thereby,
the price λk charged by the MBS is also upper-bounded.
Otherwise, if λk is too high (i.e., making ψ(γ˜k, p˜k)<λshkpk),
FU k will stop transmitting and be forced out of the game. With
the aforementioned bound on uk, we look for the constraint
on λk in (10). However, since uk in (10) is a transcendental
function, it is difficult to derive a closed-form expression of the
constraint on λk. Then, the challenge of analyzing Gl is to find
an efficient way for obtaining the optimal price λˆ.
By jointly investigating the leader and the follower sub-
games, we can show that a finite, optimal price λˆk for each
FU coexists with the NE of the follower subgame.
Theorem 3. In the Stackelberg game defined by (6) and (7), at
least one pure-strategy SE with finite price vector λˆ from the
leader game exists.
Proof. The proof is based on Theorem 3.2 of [7]. Given the
condition that each local strategy in the game is compact and
convex and the corresponding payoff function is quasiconcave,
the existence of a pure-strategy SE is guaranteed. For the FUs,
quasiconcavity of uk(p,λ) in pi is given by Lemma 1. For the
MBS, u0 is an affine function of λ, hence being quasiconcave
in λ. It is trivial that p and λ are convex and compact, then
based on Theorem 3.2 of [7], there exists a pure-strategy NE in
the game. Beyond the discussion after (12) on the fact that 0 ≤
λk < ∞, we can derive the relationship of the BRs between
the FUs and the MBS from ∂uk
∂pk
= 0 as:
λ˜k =
WG˜k
hk(1 + γ˜k)(p˜k + pa)
−
W log(1 + γ˜k)
hk(p˜k + pa)2
, (13)
in which p˜k and γ˜k are the local BR and the corresponding
SINR. G˜k is given by (27) in Appendix A. For (13), the value
of the right-hand side expression is upper-bounded since 0 ≤
p˜k ≤ pmaxk . Then λ˜k is finite.
Our approximate solution to the leader subgame is inspired
by the pioneering work of [4], which models the asymptotic
behaviors of the equilibriu bhum power vector and the corre-
sponding payments. We assume that each FU’s behavior can be
asymptotically modeled by two regions, the price-insensitive
region and the price-sensitive region. In the price-insensitive
region, the FU’s behaviors are hardly influenced by the price.
In the price-sensitive region, the local power allocation pk is
driven toward 0. Mathematically, the two-region model can be
expressed by the following asymptotes:
• Low-price asymptote as λk → 0:{
γ∗k ≈ γˆk,
rk(λk, pk) = hk,0pˆkλk ∝ λk.
(14)
• High-price asymptote as λk →∞:
pk≈
W
λk(Nk + h0,kp0)
− pa. (15)
In (14), γ˜k is the equilibrium SINR when λk=0. The details
for deriving (14) and (15) is presented in Appendix D. Since in
the low-price asymptote, rk increases with λk and in the high-
price asymptote it decreases with λk, the maximum payment
must happen between the two regions. Then, we can extend
the two FU payment asymptotes toward each other until they
meet at the intersection price λak. With such an approximation,
rk(λ
a
k, pk) will be the maximum payment received from FU k.
Combining (14) and (15), we can obtain the intersection point
for the two asymptotes as:
λak ≈
W
(p∗k + pa)(N + h0,kp0)
, (16)
in which p∗k is the power allocation corresponding to the SINR
γ∗ in (14). It can be obtained by setting λ = 0 and solving (40)
with the BR-based asynchronous strategy-updating mechanism.
C. Femtocell Power Allocation in Discrete Strategies
We continue to extend the analysis of the game to the
scenario in which the FUs choose their strategies from a finite,
discrete set of powers. In this case, the conditions for NEs
(i.e., Theorems 2 and 3) are not satisfied anymore. Therefore,
the properties of the NE need to be re-evaluated. Within the
same game structure of (6) and (7), we denote the action set
of the FUs by Pk= {p1k=0, . . . , p
|Pk|
k }. It is well known that
every finite non-cooperative game has a mixed-strategy NE [7].
For the follower subgame, we define the mixed-strategies of
FU k as pik = [pi1k, . . . , pi
|P|
k ], in which pi
j
k(p
j
k) = Pr(pk = p
j
k)
is the probability for FU k to choose the j-th action pjk ∈ Pk.
Then, given any MBS price λ, there will be at least one mixed-
strategy NE for the FUs. Different from the continuous game,
the expected net payoff of FU k becomes
uk(pik,pi−k,λ)=
∑
p∈P
(ψk(pk, p−k)−λkhk,0pk)
∏
i∈K
∏
1≤j≤|Pk|
piji ,
(17)
in which
∑
j pi
j
k=1, 0≤pi
j
k≤1. Similarly, the expected revenue
of the MBS becomes
u0(λ,pi) =
∑
k∈K
λk
∑
1≤j≤|Pk|
pijkhk,0p
j
k. (18)
Due to the limit of information exchange, FU k can only
attain its local payoff uk(pjk,pi−k) each time when it chooses
pjk and the other FUs adopt the mixed strategies pi−k. To ensure
that each FU is able to learn its Nash distribution pik, we adopt
the Logit best response function (namely, the smooth BR based
on entropy perturbation) [20]:
βtk(p
j
k|pi−i)=
exp(U t−1k (p
j
k,pi−k)/τ)∑
1≤i≤|Pk|
exp(U t−1k (p
i
k,pi−k)/τ)
, (19)
in which U tk is the estimated expected payoff at time t. τ is
a positive scalar (also known as Boltzmann temperature) that
controls the sensitivity of the BR to perturbation.
Based on the two-timescale strategy learning scheme [20],
we introduce two coupled stochastic learning processes to
approximate Uk(pjk) and pik(p
j
k) in (19) as follows:
U tk(p
j
k)=U
t−1
k (p
j
k)+α
t
11(pij
k
(pj
k
))
(
utk(p
j
k)−U
t−1
k (p
j
k)
)
,
(20)
pitk(p
j
k)=pi
t−1
k (p
j
k)+α
t
2
(
βtk(p
j
k|pi−i)− pi
t−1
k (p
j
k)
)
. (21)
In (20) and (21), utk(pjk) is the instant payoff observation at the
FAP in (4) and βtk(pjk|pi−i) is the smooth BR (19). 1(pij
k
(pj
k
))
is the indicator function. 1(pij
k
(pj
k
)) = 1 if pi
j
k(p
j
k) = 1 and
otherwise 1(pij
k
(pj
k
)) = 0. The parameter sequence α
t
1 and αt2
satisfy the following conditions:

lim
T→0
T∑
t=1
αt1 = +∞, lim
T→0
T∑
t=1
(αt1)
2 < +∞,
lim
T→0
T∑
t=1
αt2 = +∞, lim
T→0
T∑
t=1
(αt2)
2 < +∞,
lim
t→0
αt
2
αt
1
= 0.
(22)
The conditions in (22) ensures that the learning of strategies
changes on a slower timescale than that of the action values.
Based on the discussion in [21], we can show that the learning
processes converges by Theorem 4:
Theorem 4. With any arbitrary pi0 and U0k , the strategy-
learning mechanism (19)-(21) almost surely converges to some
fixed point. The probability of converging to a NE is non-zero.
Proof. See Appendix E.
In the scenario of finite strategies, it is even more difficult to
obtain a SE point for the MBS prices. However, by investigating
the property of concavity in the payoff function for any element
pijk or λk of the joint strategy vector (pi,λ), we can show that
there exists at least one SE with MBS price in pure-strategy:
Theorem 5. With the discrete set of Pk, the Stackelberg game
with the payoff functions (17) and (18) has a SE composed
of the mixed-strategy power allocation pi and the pure-strategy
price λˆ, which is finite in each λˆk.
Proof. The proof for the existence of the SE follows directly
from Theorem 1 of [22]. It is easy to see that the payoff function
Uk(pi,λ) is linear (hence concave) in piik if λ and the rest of
the elements of pi are fixed. Similarly, U0(pi,λ) is linear in λk
with λ−k and pi fixed. Therefore, following the discussion of
Theorem 1 in [22] and the Kakutani fixed point theorem, there
exists a fixed point (pi∗,λ∗) satisfying Definition 1.
The proof of a finite λk in the SE is similar to that in
Theorem 3. If we assume that (λ,pi) is a SE, then from (17)
we obtain ∀k ∈ K, 1≤j≤|Pk|,∂uk
∂pi
j
k
=0, which is equivalent to
∑
p
−k
ψ(pjk, p−k)
∏
m 6=k,i
piim = λkhk,0p
j
k. (23)
Similar to the continuous-game scenario in Theorem 3, it is
easy to verify that as λk→∞, pi1k→ 1 and u0→ 0. We note
that ∀λ, the equation array (23) always has a solution since the
mixed-strategy NE exists. With (18) and (23), we can obtain
u0 =
∑
k
∑
p
j
k
∈Pk
ψ(pjk, p−k)pi
j
k
∏
m 6=k,i pi
i
m
hk,0p
j
k
, (24)
which must have a non-zero maximum value. Therefore, we
can always find a finite λk that maximize (18) with the NE of
the follower game, Otherwise, it will contradict with the fact
that u0 → 0 as λk →∞.
Following our discussion, we propose a pricing mechanism
based on the myopic best response as Algorithm 2:
Algorithm 2 Heuristic price updating
Require: The MBS sets λk = 0 and the FUs arbitrarily
initialize pi0k.
1: while the cross-tier SINR requirement (1) is not met do
2: while not converged do
3: ∀k ∈ K, FU k updates pik with (19)-(21).
4: end while
5: ∀k ∈ K, FU k report pik to the MBS.
6: The MBS announces the prices λk:
λk =
∑
p∈P ψk(pk, p−k)
∏
i∈K,j pi
j
i∑
j hk,0p
j
kpi
j
k
, (25)
7: end while
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The objective of this section is to provide insight into
the impact of pricing on the network performance at the
equilibrium, and the influence of strategy discretization on the
learning process. In the simulation, we assume that the FAPs
are randomly located indoors within a circle centered at the
MBS with a radius of 300m. Each FU is placed within a circle
centered at the corresponding FAP with a radius of 15m. The
channel gains of the transmitter-receiver pairs are generated
by a lognormal shadowing pathloss model with hi,j = d−ki,j ,
in which k is the pathloss factor, k = 4 for the FUs and
k = 2.5 for the MU. The parameters used in the simulation
are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
MAIN PARAMETERS USED IN THE FEMTOCELL NETWORK SIMULATION
Parameter Value
Shared Bandwidth W 1MHz
Maximum MU transmit power pmax
0
27dBm
Feasible region for FU transmit power [pmin
k
, pmax
k
] [0, 20]dBm
Additional FU circuit power pa 3dBm
AWGN power Nk, k = 0, . . . , K −40dBm
SINR threshold of the MU 3dB
A. Analysis of the Equilibrium in the Continuous Game
In the first simulation, we study the influence of the MBS
price λ on the equilibrium of the follower subgame with 6
FAPs. For the convenience of demonstration, we suppose that
the MBS charges an identical price to each FU-FAP link.
Figure 1 provides the payoffs evolution of both the MBS and
the FU-FAP links at the follower-game NE as the uniform
price increases. We note in Figure 1.b that there exists an
optimal value of λ to maximize the MBS revenue, which
provides an experimental evidence of Theorem 3. We also note
from Figure 1.a and 1.b that there exists a plateau region in
which the average power efficiency remains almost the same
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Fig. 1. Influence of the unit interference price on the NE of the continuous
follower-game. (a) Average power efficiency at the NE vs. the unit price λ; (b)
total revenue collected by the MBS at the NE vs. the unit price λ.
while the MBS revenue keeps increasing. It means that without
undermining the social welfare of the femtocells, the MBS is
able to control the cross-tier interference by choosing the price
within the plateau region.
We note from Figure 1 that at the optimal MBS price (i.e.,
the SE point), the FU performance dramatically degrades from
the optimal condition. This leaves the room in practice for the
MBS to trade a portion of the revenue for a socially better
performance. Following the first simulation, we investigate the
network performance at the proposed price (16) as the number
of FAPs varies. In Figures 2 and 3, the user performance at the
proposed price is compared to that at the accurate SE price, and
that with no price (λ= 0). The accurate SE price is obtained
using a semi-exhaustive searching method with bisection, and
the utilities are obtained from Monte Carlo simulation. Figure 2
shows that at the proposed price a better FU performance can be
achieved (Figure 2.b) at the cost of losing a significant portion
of the MBS revenue (Figure 2.a). However, by measuring the
expected SINR of the MU in Figure 3, we note that such trade-
off is worthwhile since the performance deterioration of the MU
is small when compared to the gain of the FU performance.
Again, Figure 2.b and Figure 3 shows the fact that with no
externality, the network performance can be heavily impaired
(see curve “No price, λ=0”).
B. Analysis of the Equilibrium in Discrete Game
Since we are interested in the impact of strategy discretiza-
tion on the network performance, we adopt the same net-
work setup in the first simulation for the discrete game. The
parameter for the self-learning algorithm is given in Table
II. To compensate for the divergence caused by the self-
learning algorithm (Theorem 4), we examine the expected user
utilities with Monte Carlo simulation. For the convenience of
demonstration, we also suppose that the MBS places an uniform
price. The simulation results are shown in Figure 4.
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Fig. 2. MBS revenue and FU power efficiency at the SEs. (a) MBS revenue
vs. the number of FAPs; (b) FU power efficiency vs. the number of FAPs.
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Fig. 3. Expected equilibrium SINR at the MU vs. the number of FAPs.
TABLE II
MAIN PARAMETERS USED IN THE SELF-LEARNING ALGORITHM
Parameter Value
Boltzmann temperature τ 1
Learning rate for U t
k
and pit
k
1/t and 1/t2
Number of candidate power M M = 6
Power sampling equation pj
k
= (1− j
M
)pmin
k
+ j
M
pmax
k
Figure 4.b shows the existence of an optimal λ that max-
imizes the MBS revenue. It can be interpreted as an ex-
perimental evidence of Theorem 5. Comparing Figure 4.a
and Figure 1.a, we note that in the discrete follower game
(Figure 4.a), the “plateau” region extends to λ→ 0. It means
that different from the case of continuous game (Figure 1.a),
lacking an external price does not severely undermine the social
performance of the FUs. However, the femtocell network may
suffer from discretization of the power space and only achieve
approximately 1/2 of the performance in the continuous game
at most of the NEs.
Figure 5 shows the user performance at the proposed price
with Algorithm 2, the accurate SE price and zero price,
respectively. The comparison in Figure 5 shows that the FU
performance at the proposed price is the best of the three.
However, from Figure 5.b we note that without a pricing
scheme, the FUs can still achieve a good performance level. As
the number of FAPs increases, we can observe a deterioration
in the FU performance. It means that mixed-strategies NE
in the discrete game is not as good as the continuous-game
NE in maintaining the performance when the size of network
increases (see Figure 2.b).
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Fig. 4. Influence of the unit interference price on the NE of the discrete
follower-game. (a) (Expected) average power efficiency at the NE vs. the unit
price λ; (b) total revenue collected by the MBS at the NE vs. the unit price λ.
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Fig. 5. Expected MBS revenue and FU power efficiency at the SEs in the
discrete strategy space. (a) MBS revenue vs. the number of FAPs; (b) FU
power efficiency vs. the number of FAPs.
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Fig. 6. Expected transmit power vs. the number of iterations.
Finally, we demonstrate in Figures 6 and 7 the convergence
of the self-learning algorithm in the discrete game of 6 FUs.
Figure 6 shows a snapshot of FUs’ transmit-power evolution
during the learning process of Algorithm 2. Figure 7 shows
the corresponding strategy evolution of FU 1. By running the
simulation for multiple times, we observe that most of the
learning processes converge within 600 iterations.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated the price-based power
allocation problem in the two-tier femtocell network under the
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Fig. 7. Probability of power selection vs. the number of iterations by FU 1.
framework of the Stackelberg game. We have provided the
theoretical analysis of the properties of the equilibria in the
scenarios of continuous FU power space and discrete power
space, respectively. We have proposed two self-sufficient learn-
ing algorithms, one for each situation, for learning the NE of
the follower game with limited information exchange. We have
also provided the theoretical proof for the convergence of the
learning algorithms. Our simulation results provides important
insight in the different impact of the pricing mechanism on the
network performance in the scenarios of the continuous game
and the discrete game. In the simulation, we also show the
efficiency of the proposed heuristic price-searching mechanism
in the game. Our study provides an alternative way of designing
the resource allocation protocols since no intercell information
exchange is required in the femtocells.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Lemma 2 ( [18]). If a function f(s) is twice differentiable, then
supermodularity is equivalent to ∂
2f(s)
∂si∂sj
≥ 0 ∀si, sj , j 6= i.
The first and the second conditions of a supermodular game
in Definition 3 (trivially) holds for the proposed follower
subgame (7). Then, Theorem 1 can be derived based on Lemma
2. By taking the component-wise derivative of uk(pk,p−k)
with respect to pk, we obtain:
∂uk
∂pk
=−
W log(1+γk)
(pk+pa)2
+
WGk
(1+γk)(pk+pa)
−λkhk,0, (26)
in which
Gk =
hk,k
N0 + h0,kp0 +
∑
i∈K\{k} hi,kpi
. (27)
Then ∀k, j ∈ K, k 6= j, the value of ∂
2uk
∂pk∂pj
is given by:
∂2uk
∂pk∂pj
=
WHkpk
(1+γk)(pk + pa)2
+
WHkγk
(1+γk)2(pk + pa)
−
WHk
(1+γk)(pk + pa)
, (28)
in which
Hk =
hj,khk,k(
N0 + h0,kp0 +
∑
i∈K\{k} hi,kpi
)2 . (29)
It is easy to verify from (28) that ∂2uk
∂pk∂pj
≥ 0 if γk ≥ pa/pk.
By Lemma 2, uk has increasing difference between pk and any
component of p−k if γk ≥ pa/pk. By Definition 3, the proof
of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The proof of Lemma 1 is derived from investigating the
quasiconcavity of the FU payoff functions. For conciseness,
the readers are referred to Sections 3.1 and 3.4 of [19] for the
details of the definition in superlevel set and quasiconcavity.
Lemma 3 ( [19]). Suppose f : D → R be strictly quasiconcave
where D ⊂ RN is convex. Then any local maximum of f on
D is also a global maximum of f on D. Moreover, the set
argmax{f(x)|x ∈ D} is either empty or a singleton.
We first show that the utility function uk in Gf is quasicon-
cave. We examine the α-superlevel set of uk(pk, p−k) in pk,
which is equivalent to the 0-superlevel set of fα(pk, p−k):
Pk,0=
{
pk
∣∣fα(pk, p−k) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ pk ≤ pmaxk ,
fα(pk, p−k)=W log(1+γk)−(λkhk,0pk + α)(pk + pa)
}
.
(30)
We note that fα(pk, p−k) is a concave function, so Pk,α is
convex by the definition of convexity. By the definition of
quasiconcavity, ui(λ∗, pk, p−k) is quasiconcave in pk.
Then we show that ui(pk, p−k) is strictly quasiconcave in
pk so the BR is a global maximum and thus single-valued.
Without loss of generality, we consider the power allocation
pˆk∈ [0, pmaxk ] with uk(pˆk, p−k)=α. We assume that a different
power allocation p˜k satisfies uk(p˜k, p−k)≥ uk(pˆk, p−k). Cor-
respondingly, fα(pˆk, p−k)=0 and fα(p˜k, p−k)≥0. Observing
the following condition for fα(pˆk, p−k) = 0:
W log(1 +Gkpk) = (λshk,0pk + α)(pk + pa), (31)
in which Gk is given in (27). We note that the right-hand side
of (31) is a strictly increasing concave function and the left-
hand side is a strictly increasing convex function in [0, pmaxk ].
Then the solution to fα(pˆk, p−k)=0 is unique in [0, pmaxk ], so
fα(p˜k, p−k)>fα(pˆk, p−k). Based on the definition of concave
function, the following inequality also holds for 0 < δ < 1:
fα(δpˆk + (1 − δ)p˜k) ≥ δfα(pˆk) + (1− δ)fα(p˜k)
> fα(pˆk) = 0.
(32)
Therefore, the condition for strict quasiconcavity holds as
uk(δpˆk + (1 − δ)p˜k) > min (uk(p˜k, p−k), uk(pˆk, p−k)) = α.
Then Lemma 1 is a direct conclusion based on Lemma 3.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Lemma 4 ( [7]). If the best-response functions of a non-
cooperative game G are standard functions for all the players,
then the game has a unique NE in pure strategies.
Observing (4), we note that the maximum net-payoff function
is lower-bounded by 0 with pk=0. Since the power vector is
always nonnegative, the property of positivity in the BR for
each FU k immediately follows Lemma 1.
We denote Ik(p−k)=(Nk+h0,kp0+
∑
j∈K\{k} hj,kpj)/hk,k.
Noting that Ik(p−k) is a strictly increasing function of p−k,
monotonicity of pˆk(p−k) can be illustrated by proving that
function pk(Ik) is monotonically increasing in Ik. From (26)
we obtain the necessary condition for pk to be the BR as
∂uk
∂pk
= 0, which is equivalent to
ω(pk, Ik) =
W (pk + pa)
Ik
−W (1 +
pk
Ik
) log(1 +
pk
Ik
)
− λkhk,k(pk + pa)
2(1 +
pk
Ik
) = 0. (33)
Since ∂pk
∂Ik
= − ∂ω
∂Ik
/ ∂ω
∂pk
, we have
∂ω
∂Ik
=
1
I2k
(
ξ(pk)+Wpk log(1+
pk
Ik
)−Wpa
)
, (34)
in which ξ(pk) = λkhk,k(p2apk + 2pap2k + p3k), and
∂ω
∂pk
= −
1
Ik
(
ζ(pk) +W log(1+
p
Ik
)
)
(35)
in which ζ(pk) = λkhk,k(pa+pk)(pa+2Ik+3pk). We note that
∂ω
∂pk
< 0, then the property of monotonicity holds iff ∂ω
∂Ik
≥ 0.
With the inequality of logarithmic function [23], log(1 + x) ≥
x/(1 + x) for x ≥ −1, we obtain
∂ω
∂Ik
≥
1
I2k
(
ξ(pk)+
W
Ik + pk
(
p2k − pa(Ik + pk)
))
. (36)
Therefore, ∂pk
∂Ik
≥ 0 if p2k − pa(Ik + pk) ≥ 0. Then we obtain
the condition for pˆk(p−k) to be monotonic as:
hk,kpk
Nk + h0,kp0 +
∑
j∈K hj,kpk
≥
pa
pk
. (37)
The proof of scalability is based on Lemma 1. According
to Lemma 1, there is a one-to-one correspondence between pˆk
and γˆk. We define Jk(p−k) =
∑
j∈K\{k} hj,kpj , then from (2)
the BR can be written as
pˆk(p−k) =
γˆk (N0 + h0,kp0 + Jk(p−k))
hk,k
. (38)
From ∂uk
∂pk
= 0, we can prove that ∂γk
∂Jk
≤ 0 with the same
technique as proving monotonicity (which is omitted for con-
ciseness). Therefore, γk is a decreasing function of Jk. Since
Jk(p−k) is a standard function [18], we realize that if α > 1,
γˆk(αp−k) ≤ γˆk(p−k) and Jk(αp−k) ≤ αJk(p−k). Then,
monotonicity holds for pˆk(p−k) since
pˆk(αp−k) ≤
γˆk(p−k) (N0+h0,kp0+αJk(p−k))
hk,k
≤ αpˆk(p−k).
(39)
Therefore, pˆk(p−k) is a standard function. Based on Lemma 4,
the NE of the follower subgame (7) is unique.
APPENDIX D
THE DERIVATION OF ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR MODELS
The necessary condition for the NE of the FUs is given by
(13). As λk → 0, the solution of the BRs in the follower game
will be independent of λk and can be approximated by
(1 + γk) log(1 + γk)−Wγk −WGkpa = 0, k ∈ K, (40)
in which Gk is given by (27). From Lemma 1, the solution
to (40) is unique. Then the payment by FU k will be a linear
function of λk, rk = hk,0pˆkλk.
As λk →∞, ∀k ∈ K, pk → 0. From (13) we obtain:
hk,kλk(pk + pa)=
Whk,k
Ik+ hk,kpk
−
W log(1 +
hk,kpk
Ik
)
(pk + pa)
, (41)
in which Ik is the sum of interference plus noise defined in
Appendix C. With pk → 0, ∀k, (41) can be approximated by:
hk,kλk(pk + pa)≈
Whk,k
Nk + h0,kp0
. (42)
From (42) we obtain
pk≈
W
λk(Nk + h0,kp0)
− pa. (43)
Based on (40) and (43) we obtain the asymptotic models (14)
and (15) for the FU behaviors.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Lemma 5 ( [21]). Consider game G with payoff function
uk(s) for player k. If the sequence of stochastic fictitious
play converges, it also holds for game G˜ with payoff function
u˜k(s) = κkuk(s) + ϑ(sk), in which κk is a positive constant
and ϑ(sk) only depends on player k’s own behavior.
Lemma 6 ( [21]). Consider stochastic fictitious play starting
from any arbitrary pi0. If G is a supermodular game, then
Pr(ω{pi0k} ⊂ RP or ω{pi
0
k} ⊂Mi ∩ [pik,pik] for k) = 1
where ω{pi0k} is an invariant set of the solution trajectory
starting from pi0k. RP is the set of rest points (fixed points) and
pik,pik ∈ RP such that RP ⊂ [pik,pik]. Mi is a finite Lipschitz
submanifold and every persistent non-convergence trajectory is
asymptotic to one in Mi.
The proof of Theorem 4 starts by investigating the property
of supermodularity in the FU subgame. With discrete power
set, the expected payoff function (17) can be rewritten as:
uk(pik,pi−k,λ)=
∑
p∈P
ψk(pk, p−k)
∏
i∈K,j
piji −
∑
j
λkhk,0p
j
kpi
j
k,
(44)
which is in the form uk(pi)=κku˜k(pi)+ϑ(pik) with κk=1. By
Lemma 5, we only need to check the game with payoff
u˜k(pik,pi−k,λ)=
∑
p∈P
ψk(pk, p−k)
∏
i∈K,j
piji . (45)
With Definition 3 and Lemma 2, it is easy to check that
the game with payoff function (45) and mixed strategies is a
supermodular game. Based on Theorem 6 of [20], the process
of pitk produced by (19)-(21) will almost surely be an asymptotic
pseudotrajectory of the smooth BR dynamics:
p˙ik = βk(pi−k)− pik.
Then, based on Lemma 6, for the game with payoff (45)
stochastic fictitious play almost surely converges with any
arbitrary initial pi0. With Lemma 5, the convergence holds for
the original subgame with payoff uk, so Theorem 4 is proved.
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